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Abstract— Providing efficient data aggregation while preserv-
ing data privacy is a challenging problem in wireless sensor net-
works research. In this paper, we present two privacy-preserving
data aggregation schemes for additive aggregation functions. The
first scheme – Cluster-based Private Data Aggregation (CPDA)–
leverages clustering protocol and algebraic properties of poly-
nomials. It has the advantage of incurring less communication
overhead. The second scheme – Slice-Mix-AggRegaTe (SMART)–
builds on slicing techniques and the associative property of addi-
tion. It has the advantage of incurring less computation overhead.
The goal of our work is to bridge the gap between collaborative
data collection by wireless sensor networks and data privacy.
We assess the two schemes by privacy-preservation efficacy,
communication overhead, and data aggregation accuracy. We
present simulation results of our schemes and compare their
performance to a typical data aggregation scheme – TAG, where
no data privacy protection is provided. Results show the efficacy
and efficiency of our schemes. To the best of our knowledge, this
paper is among the first on privacy-preserving data aggregation
in wireless sensor networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is an ad-hoc network
composed of small sensor nodes deployed in large numbers
to sense the physical world. Wireless sensor networks have
very broad application prospects including both military and
civilian usage. They include surveillance [1], tracking at
critical facilities [2], or monitoring animal habitats [3]. Sensor
networks have the potential to radically change the way people
observe and interact with their environment.
Sensors are usually resource-limited and power-constrained.
They suffer from restricted computation, communication, and
power resources. Sensors can provide fine-grained raw data.
Alternatively, they may need to collaborate on in-network
processing to reduce the amount of raw data sent, thus
conserving resources such as communication bandwidth and
energy. We refer to such in-network processing generically as
data aggregation. In many sensor network applications, the
designer is usually concerned with aggregate statistics such as
SUM, AVERAGE, or MAX/MIN of data readings over a certain
region or period. As a result, data aggregation in WSNs has
received substantial attention.
As sensor network applications expand to include increas-
ingly sensitive measurements of everyday life, preserving data
privacy becomes an increasingly important concern. For exam-
ple, a future application might measure household details such
as power and water usage, computing average trends and mak-
ing local recommendations. Without providing proper privacy
protection, such applications of WSNs will not be practical,
since participating parties may not allow tracking their private
data. In this paper, we discuss how to carry privacy-preserving
data aggregation in wireless sensor networks. In the following,
we first elaborate two specific motivating applications of using
wireless sensor network to carry out private data aggregation.
1) As alluded above, wireless sensors may be placed in
houses to collect statistics about water and electricity
consumption within a large neighborhood. The aggre-
gated population statistics may be useful for individual,
business, and government agencies for resource planning
purposes and usage advice. However, the readings of
sensors could reveal daily activities of a household, such
as when all family members are gone or when someone
is taking a shower (different water appliances have
distinct signatures of consumption that can reveal their
identity). Hence we need a way to collect the aggregated
sensor readings while at the same time preserve data
privacy.
2) Future in-home floor sensors, collecting weight infor-
mation, are used together with shoe-mounted sensors,
collecting exercise-related information, in an obesity
study to correlate exercise and weight loss. Aggregate
statistics from those data are useful for agencies such as
Department of Health and Human Services, as well as
insurance companies for medical research and financial
planning purposes. However, individual’s health data
should be kept private and not be known to other people.
From these data aggregation examples, we see why preserv-
ing the privacy of individual sensor readings while obtaining
accurate aggregate statistics can be an important requirement.
The protection of privacy also gives us add-on benefits includ-
ing enhanced security. Consider the scenario when an adver-
sary compromises a portion of the sensor nodes: when there is
no privacy protection, the comprised nodes can overhear the
data messages and decrypt them to get sensitive information.
However, with privacy protection, even if data are overheard
and decrypted, it is still difficult for the adversary to recover
sensitive information.
Consequently, providing a reasonable guideline on building
systems that perform private data aggregation is desirable. It is
well-known that end-to-end data encryption is able to protect
private communications between two parties (such as the data
source and data sink), as long as the two parties have agree-
ment on encryption keys. However, end-to-end encryption or
link level encryption alone is not a good candidate for private
data aggregation. This is because:
1) If end-to-end communications are encrypted, the in-
termediate nodes could not easily perform in-network
processing to get aggregated results.
2) Even when data are encrypted at the link level, the other
end of the communication is still able to decrypt it and
get the private data. Hence privacy is violated.
Though research on privacy-preserving computation has
been active in other domains including cryptography and data
mining, previously-studied schemes are not readily applicable
to private data aggregations in WSNs. Most of them are either
not suitable for or too computational-expensive to be used in
the resource-constrained sensor networks, as we will discuss
in detail in Section II.
In this paper, we present two privacy-preserving data aggre-
gation schemes called Cluster-based Private Data Aggregation
(CPDA) and Slice-Mix-AggRegaTe (SMART) respectively, for
additive aggregation functions in WSNs. The goal of our work
is to bridge the gap between collaborative data aggregation
and data privacy in wireless sensor networks. When there is
no packet loss, in both CPDA and SMART, the sensor network
can obtain a precise aggregation result while guaranteeing that
no private sensor reading is released to other sensors. Observe
that this is a stronger result than previously proposed protocols
that are able to compute approximate aggregates only (without
violating privacy). Our presented schemes can be built on
top of existing secure communication protocols. Therefore,
both security and privacy are supported by the proposed data
aggregation schemes.
In the CPDA scheme, sensor nodes are formed randomly
into clusters. Within each cluster, our design leverages al-
gebraic properties of polynomials to calculate the desired
aggregate value. At the same time, it guarantees that no
individual node knows the data values of other nodes. The
intermediate aggregate values in each cluster will be further
aggregated (along an aggregation tree) on their way to the
data sink. In the SMART scheme, each node hides its private
data by slicing it into pieces. It sends encrypted data slices to
different intermediate aggregation nodes. After the pieces are
received, intermediate nodes calculate intermediate aggregate
values and further aggregate them to the sink. In both schemes,
data privacy is preserved while aggregation is carrying out.
We evaluate the two schemes in terms of efficacy of privacy
preservation, communication overhead, and data aggregation
accuracy, comparing them with a commonly used data aggre-
gation scheme TAG [4], where no data privacy is provided.
Simulation results demonstrate the efficacy and efficiency of
our schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
summarizes the related work. Section III describes the model
and requirements of privacy-preserving data aggregation in
wireless sensor networks. Section IV provides our two algo-
rithms for private data aggregation. Section V evaluates the
proposed schemes. We summarize our findings and lay out
future research directions in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In typical wireless sensor networks, sensor nodes are usually
resource-constrained and battery-limited. In order to save
resources and energy, data must be aggregated to avoid
overwhelming amounts of traffic in the network. There has
been extensive work on data aggregation schemes in sensor
networks, including [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]. These efforts
share the assumption that all sensors are trusted and all com-
munications are secure. However, in reality, sensor networks
are likely to be deployed in an untrusted environment, where
links, for example, can be eavesdropped. An adversary may
compromise cryptographic keys and manipulate the data.
Work presented in [10], [11], [12] investigates secure data
aggregation schemes in the face of adversaries who try to
tamper with nodes or steal the information. Work presented
in [13], [14] shows how to set up secret keys between sensor
nodes to guarantee secure communications. For most existing
secure data aggregation schemes though, an intermediate ag-
gregation node has to decrypt the received data, then aggregate
the data according to the corresponding aggregation function,
and finally encrypt the aggregated result before forwarding
it. This sequence is fairly expensive for data aggregation in
sensor networks. To reduce computational overhead, Girao et
al. [16] and Castelluccia et al. [17] propose using homomor-
phic encryption ciphers, which allow efficient aggregation of
encrypted data without decryption involved in the intermediate
nodes. Though these schemes are more efficient and can
provide end-to-end privacy, they do not protect the private
data of a node from being known by other neighboring or
intermediate nodes. This is because when the neighboring or
intermediate nodes know the encryption key, they can decrypt
the private data. In contrast, the private data aggregation
schemes we present in this paper can guarantee that the private
data of a sensor node is not released to any other nodes.
Privacy has also been studied in the data mining do-
main [18], [19], [20], [21]. Two major classes of schemes are
used. The first class is based on data perturbation (random-
ization) techniques. In a data perturbation scheme, a random
number drawn from a certain distribution is added to the
private data. Given the distribution of the random perturbation,
recovering the aggregated result is possible. At the same time,
by using the randomized data to mask the private values,
privacy is achieved. However, data perturbation techniques
have the drawback that they do not yield accurate aggregation
results. Furthermore, as shown by Kargupta et al. in [20] and
by Huang et al. in [21], certain types of data perturbation might
not preserve privacy well.
Another class of privacy-preserving data mining
schemes [22], [23], [24] is based on Secure Multi-party
Computation (SMC) techniques [25], [26], [27]. SMC deals
with the problem of a joint computation of a function with
multi-party private inputs. SMC usually leverages public-key
cryptography. Hence SMC-based privacy-preserving data
mining schemes are usually computationally expensive,
which is not applicable to resource-constrained wireless
sensor networks.
As we will show in the rest of this paper, unlike previous
privacy-preserving approaches, our new private data aggre-
gation schemes have the advantages: (1) They preserve data
privacy such that individual sensor data is only known to their
owner; (2) The aggregation result is accurate when there is no
data loss; (3) They are more efficient and hence more suitable
for resource-constrained wireless sensor networks.
III. MODEL AND BACKGROUND
A. Sensor Networks and the Data Aggregation Model
In this paper, a sensor network is modeled as a connected
graph G(V, E), where sensor nodes are represented as the set
of vertices V and wireless links as the set of edges E . The
number of sensor nodes is defined as |V | = N .
A data aggregation function is defined as y(t) ,
f(d1(t), d2(t), · · · , dN (t)), where di(t) is the individual sen-
sor reading at time t for node i. Typical functions of f include
sum, average, min, max and count. If di(i = 1, · · · , N) is
given, the computation of y at a query server (data sink)
is trivial. However, due to the large data traffic in sensor
networks, bandwidth constraints on wireless links, and large
power consumption of packet transmition1, data aggregation
techniques are needed to save resources and power.
In this paper, we focus on additive aggregation functions,
that is, f(t) =
N∑
i=1
di(t). It is worth noting that using
additive aggregation functions is not too restrictive, since
many other aggregation functions, including average, count,
variance, standard deviation and any other moment of the
measured data, can be reduced to the additive aggregation
function sum [17].
B. Requirements of Private Data Aggregation
Protecting the data privacy in many wireless sensor network
applications is a major concern. The following criteria summa-
rize the desirable characteristics of a private data aggregation
scheme:
1) Privacy: Each node’s data should be only known to
itself. Furthermore, the private data aggregation scheme
should be able to handle to some extent attacks and
collusion among compromised nodes. When a sensor
network is under a malicious attack, it is possible that
some nodes may collude to uncover the private data
of other node(s). Furthermore, wireless links may be
eavesdropped by attackers to reveal private data. A good
private data aggregation scheme should be robust to such
attacks.
2) Efficiency: The goal of data aggregation is to reduce
the number of messages transmitted within the sensor
1A Berkeley mote consumes approximately the same amount of energy to
compute 800 instructions as it does in sending a single bit of data [4].
network, thus reduce resource and power usage. Data
aggregation achieves bandwidth efficiency by using in-
network processing. In private data aggregation schemes,
additional overhead is introduced to protect privacy.
However, a good private data aggregation scheme should
keep that overhead as small as possible.
3) Accuracy: An accurate aggregation of sensor data is
desired, with the constraint that no other sensors should
know the exact value of any individual sensor. Accuracy
should be a criterion to estimate the performance of
private data aggregation schemes.
C. Key Setup for Encryption
To set context for our work, in this section, we first briefly
review a random key distribution mechanism proposed in [13],
on which our proposed schemes operate.
Security Assumptions and Key Setup:
In the new private data aggregation algorithms – CPDA and
SMART– some messages are encrypted to prevent attackers
from eavesdropping. Our schemes can be built on top of exist-
ing key distribution and encryption schemes in wireless sensor
networks. Here, we briefly review a random key distribution
mechanism proposed in [13] which we use in the design of
our schemes.
In [13], key distribution consists of three phases: (1)key
pre-distribution, (2)shared-key discovery, and (3)path-key es-
tablishment. In the pre-distribution phase, a large key-pool of
K keys and their corresponding identities are generated. For
each sensor within the sensor network, k keys are randomly
drawn from the key-pool. These k keys form a key ring for
a sensor node. During the key-discovery phase, each sensor
node finds out which neighbors share a common key with
itself by exchanging discovery messages. If two neighboring
nodes share a common key then there is a secure link between
two nodes. In the path-key establishment phase, a path-key is
assigned to the pairs of neighboring sensor nodes who do not
share a common key but can be connected by two or more
multi-hop secure links at the end of the shared-key discovery
phase.
In the random key distribution mechanism mentioned above,
the probability that any pair of nodes possess at least one
common key is:
pconnect = 1− ((K − k)!)
2
(K − 2k)!K! . (1)
Let the probability that any other node can overhear the
encrypted message by a given key be poverhear. It is the
probability that a third node possesses the same key as this
node. Therefore,
poverhear =
k
K
. (2)
The key distribution algorithm discussed above is efficient
in terms of using a small number of keys to support secure
communication in a large-scale sensor network, hence prevent-
ing eavesdroping. This is illustrated in the following numerical
example.
Assume a key pool of size K = 10000, and key ring size
of k = 200. The probability that any pair of nodes can find a
shared key in common is pconnect = 98.3% by Equation (1).
In other words, the probability that a pair of nodes does not
share a common key is 1.7%. For these pairs who do not
share a common key, they can use the path-key establishment
procedure described above to establish a shared key. Once a
pair of nodes select a shared key, the probability that any other
node owns the same key is poverhear = kK = 0.2%, which is
very small.
IV. PRIVATE DATA AGGREGATION PROTOCOLS
In this section, we present two private data aggregation
protocols focusing on additive data aggregation. The first
scheme is called Cluster-based Private Data Aggregation
(CPDA). It consists of three phases: cluster formation, cal-
culation of the aggregate results within clusters, and cluster
data aggregation. The second scheme is called “Slice-Mix-
AggRegaTe (SMART)”. In SMART, each node hides its private
data by slicing the data and sending encrypted data slices to
different aggregators. Then the aggregators collect and forward
data to a query server. When the server receives the aggregated
data, it calculates the final aggregation result.
A. Cluster-based Private Data Aggregation (CPDA)
1) Formation of Clusters: The first step in CPDA is to
construct clusters to perform intermediate aggregations. We
propose a distributed protocol for this purpose.
The cluster formation procedure is illustrated in Figure 1. A
query server Q triggers a query by a HELLO message. Upon
receiving the HELLO message, a sensor node elects itself as
a cluster leader with a probability pc, which is a preselected
parameter for all nodes. If a node becomes a cluster leader, it
will forward the HELLO message to its neighbors; otherwise,
the node waits for a certain period of time to get HELLO
messages from its neighbors, then it decides to join one of the
clusters by broadcasting a JOIN message. As this procedure
goes on, multiple clusters are constructed.
2) Calculation within Clusters: The second step of CPDA
is the intermediate aggregations within clusters. To simplify
the discussion, we use a simple scenario, where a cluster
contains three members: A, B, and C. a, b and c represent
the private data held by nodes A, B and C, respectively. Let
A be the cluster leader of this cluster. Let B and C be cluster
members. Our privacy-preserving aggregation protocol based
on the additive property of polynomials. Figure 2 illustrates
the message exchange among the three nodes to obtain the
desired sum without releasing individual private data.
First, nodes within a cluster share a common (non-private)
knowledge of non-zero numbers, refer to as seeds, x, y, and z,
which are distinct with each other (as shown in Figure 2(1)).
Then node A calculates
vAA = a+ r
A
1 x+ r
A
2 x
2,
vAB = a+ r
A
1 y + r
A
2 y
2,
vAC = a+ r
A
1 z + r
A
2 z
2,
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(a) Query Server Q triggers a
query by HELLO message. A re-
cipient of HELLO message elects
itself as a cluster leader randomly.
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(b) A and X become cluster
leader, so they broadcast the
HELLO message to their neigh-
bors.
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(c) Node E receives multi-
ple HELLO messages, then
E randomly selects one to
join.
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(d) Several clusters have been constructed
and the aggregation tree of cluster leaders is
formed
Fig. 1. Formation of clusters
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Fig. 2. Message exchange
where rA1 and rA2 are two random numbers generated by node
A, and known only to node A. Similarly, node B and C
calculate vBA , vBB , vBC and vCA , vCB , vCC independently as:
NodeB : vBA = b+ r
B
1 x+ r
B
2 x
2,
vBB = b+ r
B
1 y + r
B
2 y
2,
vBC = b+ r
B
1 z + r
B
2 z
2.
NodeC : vCA = c+ r
C
1 x+ r
C
2 x
2,
vCB = c+ r
C
1 y + r
C
2 y
2,
vCC = c+ r
C
1 z + r
C
2 z
2.
Then node A encrypts vAB and sends to B using the shared key
between A and B. It also encrypts vAC and sends to C using the
sharing key between A and C (Figure 2(2)). Similarly node
B encrypts and sends vBA to A and vBC to C; node C encrypts
and sends vCA to A and vCB to B. When node A receives vBA
and vCA , it has the knowledge of vAA = a + rA1 x + rA2 x2,
vBA = b + r
B
1 x + r
B
2 x
2 and vCA = c + rC1 x + rC2 x2. Next,
node A calculates assembled value FA = vAA + vBA + vCA =
(a + b + c) + r1x + r2x2, where r1 = rA1 + rB1 + rC1 and
r2 = rA2 + r
B
2 + r
C
2 . Similarly node B and C calculate their
assembled values FB = vAB + vBB + vCB = (a+ b+ c) + r1y+
r2y
2 and FC = vAC + vBC + vCC = (a + b + c) + r1z + r2z2
respectively. Then node B and C broadcast FB and FC to the
cluster leader A (Figure 2(3)). So far, node A knows all the
assembled values:
FA = vAA + v
B
A + v
C
A = (a+ b+ c) + r1x+ r2x
2,
FB = vAB + v
B
B + v
C
B = (a+ b+ c) + r1y + r2y
2, (3)
FC = vAC + v
B
C + v
C
C = (a+ b+ c) + r1z + r2z
2.
Then the cluster leader A can deduce the aggregate value (a+
b + c). This is because x, y, z, FA, FB , FC are known to A.
By rewriting Equation (3) as
U = G−1F, (4)
where G =
 1 x x21 y y2
1 z z2
, U =
 a+ b+ cr1
r2
, and F =
[FA, FB , FC ]T , a+ b+ c is known as the first element of U .
Note that G is of full rank, because x, y and z are distinct
numbers.
It is necessary to encrypt vAB , vAC , vBA , vBC , vCA , and vCB . For
example, if node C overhears the value vAB , then C knows
vAB , v
A
C , and FA, then C can deduce vAA = FA − vAB − vAC ,
and further it can obtain a if x, vAA , vAB , vAC are known.
However, if node A encrypts vAB and sends it to node B, then
node C cannot get vAB . With only vAC , FA and x from node
A, node C cannot deduce the value of a. However, if nodes
B and C collude by releasing A’s information (vAB and vAC ) to
each other, then A’s data will be disclosed. To prevent such
collusion, the cluster size should be large. In a cluster of size
m, if less than (m − 1) nodes collude, the data won’t be
disclosed.
3) Cluster Data Aggregation: A common technique for
data aggregation is to build a routing tree. We implement
CPDA on top of the TAG Tiny AGgregation [4] protocol. Each
cluster leader routes the derived sum within the cluster back
towards the query server through a TAG routing tree rooted at
the server.
Discussions on Parameter Selection in CPDA
In CPDA, a larger cluster size introduces a larger com-
putational overhead (Equation (4). However, a larger cluster
size is preferred for the sake of improved privacy under node
collusion attacks. In CPDA, we should guarantee a cluster size
m ≥ 3. Generally, let’s define mc as the minimum cluster size.
We should set mc ≥ 3. Next, we discuss how to ensure every
cluster has a cluster size larger than mc, and how to tune
parameter pc to reduce communication overhead in cluster
formation phase.
If a cluster Ci has a size smaller than mc, (|Ci| < mc),
the cluster leader of Ci needs to broadcast a “merge” request
to join another cluster. In the following, we show that given
a proper pc, the percentage of clusters that need to merge is
small, and the cluster size is in a reasonable range.
We model a sensor network as a random network, assuming
d is the average degree of a node. If a node i is the cluster
leader of a cluster of Ci, then the probability that a neighbor
of i joins the Ci is
pi = P (a neighbor of i joins Ci) = (1− pc) 1
dpc
, (5)
where 1−pc is the probability that the neighbor is not a leader
of another cluster. Only in this case is the neighbor able to join
Ci. A neighbor is surrounded by dpc cluster leaders including
i, therefore 1
dpc
is the probability that a non-leader neighbor
of i joins Ci. The probability that cluster Ci has k members
is:
P (|Ci| = k) =
(
d
k − 1
)
pi
(k−1)(1− pi)d−k+1. (6)
Therefore, the percentage of clusters that need to merge is
given by:
P (|Ci| < mc) =
mc−1∑
k=1
P (|Ci| = k)
=
mc−2∑
k=0
(
d
k
)
pi
k(1− pi)d−k. (7)
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Fig. 3. Distribution of cluster size with different pc
For a fixed network density, for example, d = 20, P (|Ci| <
3) = 6.9% if pc = 1/5; P (|Ci| < 3) = 1.8% if pc =
1/6. Figure 3 shows that the distribution of cluster size can
be controlled by parameter pc without merging. By local
observation of any sensor node, the number of clusters is
(d + 1)pc. On the other hand, if we desire k nodes in each
cluster, then the desired cluster size should be d+1k . Therefore,
if we target the cluster size around k, and choose pc = 1k .
B. Slice-Mix-AggRegaTe (SMART)
One drawback of the cluster based protocol is the compu-
tational overhead of data aggregation within clusters (Equa-
tion (4)). In this section, we present a new scheme SMART,
which reduces computational overhead at the cost of slightly
increased communication bandwidth consumption. As the
name suggests, “Slice-Mix-AggRegaTe (SMART)” is a three-
step scheme for private-preserving data aggregation.
Step 1 (“Slicing”): Each node i (i = 1, · · · , N ), randomly
selects a set of nodes Si (J = |Si|) within h hops. For a dense
WSN, we can take h = 1. Node i then slices its private data
di randomly into J pieces (i.e., represents it as a sum of J
numbers).
One of the J pieces is kept at node i itself. The remaining
J − 1 pieces are encrypted and sent to nodes in the randomly
selected set Si. We denote dij as a piece of data sent from
node i to node j. For nodes to which node i does not send any
slice, dij = 0. The desired aggregate result can be expressed
as
f =
N∑
i=1
di =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
dij , (8)
where dij = 0,∀j 6∈ Si.
Step 2 (“Mixing”): When a node j receives an encrypted
slice, it decrypts the data using its shared key with the sender.
Upon receiving the first slice, the node waits for a certain time,
which guarantees that all slices of this round of aggregation are
received. Then, it sums up all the received slices rj =
∑N
i dij ,
where dij = 0, j 6∈ Si.
Step 3 (“Aggregation”): All nodes aggregate the data and
send the result to the query server. Similar to the aggregation
step of CPDA, the aggregation is designed using tree-based
routing protocols. When a node gets all data slices, it forwards
a message of the sum addressed to its parent, which in
turn forwards the message along the tree. Eventually the
aggregation reaches the root (query server). Since
N∑
j=1
rj =
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
dij =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
dij . (9)
The final data at the root is the aggregation of all sensor data
f by Equation (8) and (9).
Figure 4 illustrates the 3-step scheme of the SMART pro-
tocol for a sensor network with network size N = 7, slicing
size J = 3, and hop length h = 1. For SMART, in step 1,
sliced data should be encrypted as in CPDA.
V. EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the private-preserving data
aggregation schemes presented in this paper. We evaluate
how our schemes perform in terms of privacy-preservation,
efficiency, and aggregation accuracy. We use TAG [4], a typical
data aggregation scheme as the baseline. Since the design
of TAG does not take privacy into consideration, no data
privacy protection is provided. We only use it to evaluate
the efficiency and aggregation accuracy compared with our
proposed schemes.
A. Privacy-preservation Efficacy
In order to evaluate the performance of privacy-preservation,
we first define the privacy metric. In wireless sensor networks,
private data of a sensor node s may be disclosed to others when
attackers can eavesdrop on communication and/or collude.
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(a) Slicing (J = 3, h = 1):dij(i 6= j) is
encrypted and transmitted from node i to j, where
j 6∈ Si. dii is the data piece kept at node i.
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(b) Mixing: Each node i decrypts all data pieces received
and sums them up including the one kept at itself (dii)
as ri.
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(c) Aggregation (No encryption is needed)
Fig. 4. Illustration of three steps in SMART
That is, there are two cases that may lead to privacy violation:
(1) An unauthorized sensor node holds a communication key
and is able to decrypt messages sent from s. Under our key
distribution mechanism, the probability that an eavesdropper
has the communication key used by s and one of its neighbors
is poverhear (Equation (2)). (2) Multiple neighbors of s collude
to steal private data collected by s. We can assume the
probability that any two nodes collude is pcollude.
For the simplicity of derivation, let us define poverhear =
pcollude , q. q is interpreted as the probability that the link
level privacy is broken. A privacy metric P(q) is defined as
the probability that the private data of node s is disclosed
for a given q under either conditions above. P(q) measures
the performance of the privacy-preservation of a private data
aggregation scheme.
1) Privacy-preservation Analysis of CPDA: In the CPDA
scheme, private data may be disclosed to neighbors only when
the sensor nodes exchange messages within the same cluster.
Given a cluster of size m, a node needs to send m − 1
encrypted messages to other m−1 members within the cluster.
Only if a node knows all m − 1 keys, can it crack all other
m−1 neighbors’ private data. Otherwise, no data is disclosed.
Consequently, P(q) is estimated as
P(q) =
dmax∑
k=mc
P (m = k)(1− (1− q (k−1)×(k−2)2 )k), (10)
where dmax is the maximum cluster size. mc is the required
minimum cluster size. P (m = k) represents the probability
that a cluster size is k. Figure 5 shows that under different
cluster sizes, an eavesdropper has to break all the dashed links
to steal other members’ private data. In a cluster, either all or
none private data is known to an eavesdropper. Assuming the
probability for an eavesdropper to break one dashed link is q,
then q
(k−1)×(k−2)
2 is the probability that a node can overhear
all encrypted messages to other members in the cluster of size
k, and thus know their private data.
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Fig. 5. An eavesdropper has to break all the dashed links to steal all private
data in a cluster; otherwise no private data is disclosed
2) Privacy-preservation Analysis of SMART: In the SMART
scheme, a sensor node s slices its private data into J pieces
and then encrypts and sends J − 1 pieces to its neighbors. It
keeps one piece to itself. As a result, the out-degree of s is
J − 1 and the in-degree of s is the number of neighbors who
encrypt and send data pieces to s. Only if an eavesdropper
breaks J − 1 outgoing links and all incoming links of a node
s, will it be able to crack the private data held by s. Therefore,
P(q) can be approximated by
P(q) = qx−1
dmax∑
k=0
P (in− degree = k) qk, (11)
where dmax is the maximum in-degree in a network. P (in−
degree = k) is the probability that the in-degree of a node is
k.
Figure 6 compares privacy-preservation performance of
CPDA and SMART via simulation, where we consider a 1000-
node random network. The average degree of a node is 16. As
we can see from Figure 6, for CPDA, the smaller the value
of pc (the probability of a node independently becoming a
cluster leader), the larger the average cluster size, hence the
better the privacy-preservation performance is. However, if a
cluster size is larger, the computational overhead to compute
the intermediate aggregation value by Equation (4) will also
be larger. In SMART, the larger the value of J (the number
of slices each node chooses to decompose its private data),
the better privacy can be achieved. However, a larger J will
also yield larger communication overhead. For both CPDA
and SMART, there is a design tradeoff between the privacy
protection and computation/communication efficiency.
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Fig. 6. P(q) under CPDA and SMART.
B. Communication Overhead
CPDA and SMART use data-hiding techniques and en-
crypted communication to protect data privacy. This introduces
some communication overhead. In order to investigate band-
width efficiency of these schemes, we implemented CPDA and
SMART in ns2 on top of the data aggregation component of
TAG. We did extensive simulations and collected results to
compare these two schemes together with TAG (no privacy
protection). In our experiments, we consider networks with
600 sensor nodes. These nodes are randomly deployed over
a 400meters× 400meters area. The transmission range of a
sensor node is 50 meters and data rate is 1 Mbps.
At the beginning of each simulation, a query is delivered
from the query server to the sensor nodes. Similar to TAG [4],
the query specifies an epoch duration E, which is the amount
of time for the data aggregation procedure to finish. Upon
receiving such a query, a parent node on the aggregation tree
subdivides the epoch such that its children are required to
deliver their data (protected data in CPDA and SMART, or
unprotected data in TAG) in this parent-defined time interval.
Figure 7(a) shows the communication overhead of TAG,
CPDA with pc = 0.3, and SMART with J=3 under different
epoch durations. We use the total number of bytes of all
packets communicated during the aggregation as the metric.
Each point in the figure is the average result of 50 runs of
the simulation. In each run, one randomly generated sensor
network topology is used. The vertical line of each data point
represents the 95% confidence interval of the data collected.
Simulation results can be explained by analyzing the num-
ber of exchanged messages in each scheme. In TAG, each
node needs to send 2 messages for data aggregation: one
Hello message to form an aggregation tree, and one message
for data aggregation. In our implementation of CPDA, a
cluster leader sends roughly 4 messages and cluster members
sends 3 messages for private data aggregation. Accordingly,
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Fig. 7. Communication overhead
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(b) Accuracy of CPDA with respect to pc.
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Fig. 8. Accuracy under collision and packet loss
4pc + 3(1− pc) = 3 + pc is the average number of messages
sent by a node in CPDA. Thus, the message overhead in CPDA
is less than twice as that in TAG. SMART, with J = 3, needs to
exchange 2 messages during the slicing step and 2 messages
for data aggregation (the same as TAG). Hence, each node
needs 4 messages for the private data aggregation. Therefore,
the overhead of SMART is double that of TAG.
Now let us further study the effect of pc on the communi-
cation overhead in CPDA. Figure 7(b) shows the result with
pc = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 respectively. As we can see, the larger the
pc value, the larger the communication overhead. It is very
interesting to notice that when pc = 0.1, communication
overhead is much lower than TAG. This is because when pc is
too small, many nodes cannot be covered due to insufficient
number of cluster leaders. This also explains why accuracy is
very low when pc = 0.1 (in Section V-C).
Finally, let us study the effect of J on the communication
overhead in SMART. Figure 7(c) shows the result with J =
2, 3, 4 respectively. As we can see, the larger the J value,
the larger the communication overhead. This is because J
represents the number of slices each node chooses to decom-
pose its private data into. Since, in slicing phase of SMART,
each node sends J − 1 pieces of sliced data to its selected
neighbors. Including one message for tree formation and one
for aggregation, the total number of messages exchanged is
roughly proportional to J + 1. Hence the larger the value of
J , the larger the communication overhead.
C. Accuracy
In ideal situations when there is no data loss in the network2,
both CPDA and SMART should get 100% accurate aggregation
results. However, in wireless sensor networks, due to collisions
over wireless channels and processing delays, messages may
get lost or delayed. Therefore, the aggregation accuracy is
affected. We define the accuracy metric as the ratio between
the collected sum by the data aggregation scheme used and
the real sum of all individual sensor nodes. A higher accuracy
value means the collected sum using the specific aggregation
scheme is more accurate. An accuracy value of 1.0 represents
the ideal situation.
Figure 8(a) shows the accuracy of TAG, CPDA (with pc =
0.3) and SMART (with J=3) from our simulation. Here we
have two observations. First, the accuracy increases as the
epoch duration increases. Two reasons contribute to this: 1)
With a larger epoch duration, the data packets to be sent
within this duration will have less chance to collide due to the
increased average packet sending intervals; 2) With a larger
epoch duration, the data packets will have a better chance of
being delivered within the deadline. The second observation
is that TAG has better accuracy than CPDA and SMART. That
is because without the communication overhead introduced by
privacy-preservation, there will be less data collisions.
Figure 8(b) shows the aggregation accuracy of CPDA with
respect to the selection of pc. First, we see when using the
2Data loss may be caused by collision in wireless channels, deadline
missing or disconnection to the query server through an aggregation tree
same pc, a larger epoch duration gives better accuracy. This
is due to the fact that a larger epoch duration lets the data
packets have a better chance of being delivered before the
timeout. Second, we see that CPDA is sensitive to pc values.
The larger the pc value, the higher the aggregation accuracy.
This is because: (1)The larger pc value is, the smaller portion
of nodes are disconnected to query server through aggrega-
tion tree. Those nodes uncovered by aggregation tree cannot
contribute their value in aggregation. (2)A larger pc usually
yields a smaller cluster size, which causes less collisions
within the cluster under the same epoch duration. Therefore,
we recommend 0.2 ≤ pc ≤ 0.3 in CPDA protocol.
Figure 8(c) illustrates the aggregation accuracy of SMART
with respect to the selection of J . Accuracy of SMART is not
sensitive to J . However, there is a slightly difference between
different J values: the larger the value of J , the lower the
aggregation accuracy. This is because when a private data
held by a node is sliced into more pieces, more messages are
needed to send all J − 1 pieces to other neighboring nodes.
Hence, more collisions occur, which causes a reduction in
the aggregation accuracy. We recommend J = 3 in SMART
protocol.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Providing efficient data aggregation while preserving data
privacy is a challenging problem in wireless sensor networks.
Many civilian applications require privacy, without which indi-
vidual parties are reluctant to participate in data collection. In
this paper, we propose two private-preserving data aggregation
schemes – CPDA, and SMART – focusing on additive data
aggregation functions. Table I summarizes these two schemes
in terms of privacy-preservation efficacy, communication over-
head, aggregation accuracy, and computational overhead.
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF CPDA AND SMART
CPDA SMART
Privacy preservation effi-
cacy
Good (0.2 ≤
pc ≤ 0.3)
Excellent (J ≥ 3)
Communication overhead Fair Large
Aggregation accuracy Good (but sensi-
tive to pc)
Good (not sensi-
tive to J)
Computational overhead Fair Small
We compare the performance of our presented schemes to
a typical data aggregation scheme – TAG. Simulation results
and theoretical analysis show the efficacy of our two schemes.
Our future work includes designing private-preserving data
aggregation schemes for general aggregation functions. We are
also investigating robust private-preserving data aggregation
schemes under malicious attacks.
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